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Abstract 
The exploitation of coltan in Central Africa can be considered a case of conflict minerals due to its 
nature. Many international organizations and bodies, national governments and private sector or-
ganizations seek to address this conflict, in particular via transparency, certification and accounta-
bility along the material supply chain. This paper analyses the international trade dimension of 
coltan and gives evidence on the dimension of illicit trade of coltan. The authors start from the 
hypothesis that illicit trade of coltan sooner or later will enter the market and will be reflected in 
the statistics. The paper is structured in the following manner: first, a short section gives a profile 
of coltan production and markets; second, an overview of the mining situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and related actors. The third section addresses mechanisms, actors and 
measurement issues involved in the international trade of coltan. The final part draws lessons for 
certification and conflict analysis and offers some guidance for future research.  
 
The paper identifies two main possible gateways to trace illegal trade in coltan: the neighboring 
countries, especially Rwanda, and the importing countries for downstream production, in particu-
lar China. Our estimation is that the value of such illicit trade comes close to $ 27 million annually 
(2009), roughly one fifth of the world market volume for tantalum production. With regard to any 
certification the paper concludes that this will become challenging for business and policy: (a) 
Central Africa currently is the largest supplier of coltan on the world market, many actors profit 
from the current situation and possess abilities to hide responsibility; (b) China will need to accept 
more responsibility, a first step would be the acceptance of the OECD guidelines on due diligence; 
(c) better regional governance in Central Africa comprises of resource taxation, a resource fund 
and fiscal coordination. An international task force may provide more robust data, however more 
research will also be needed. 
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Coltan mining in Central Africa and especially in the Eastern Kivu region of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) has often been viewed as a case for a conflict over the control of 
raw materials in a fragile state2. Although the DRC see to advance in some key areas lately, 
e.g. in macro-economic management, education enrolment or improving drinking water sup-
ply (UNEP, 2011), it remains one of the poorest countries world-wide (UNDP, 2011). Rebel 
groups and others go on fighting over access to minerals and profit from illicit trade, and the 
state still fails to provide sufficient social order resulting in unchecked criminal activities. The 
easy access to coltan and other minerals, combined with weak property rights in a country 
with weak basic institutions and a long history of civil war, and a high demand on world mar-
kets can be assumed as main determinants of insecurity and conflicts, especially in the eastern 
Congo (Nest 2011: 71ff.). 
There is a clear pledge for international action from various sides. The United Nations have 
established evidence and given recommendations by means of several Expert reports. The 
most recent one (S/2010/596) and the ensuing UN Security Council resolution (S/RES/1952) 
of late 2010 call on governments, markets and companies to establish sound systems of sup-
ply chain management as well as to impose asset freezes and travel bans for groups and indi-
viduals involved in the conflict. In a similar spirit, the G8 resolution of Heiligendamm has 
started a process to establish certified trading chains in minerals production (CTC); a first 
activity has been the development of a new geochemical method called ‘Analytical Finger-
printing’ (AFP) since 2006 that will allow exact pinpointing of the extraction source of a min-
eral used in products. Initiatives have also been taken by the private sector aiming at transpar-
ency and improving the traceability along their supply chains. The annex of this paper con-
tains a number of such initiatives. Needless to say, however, all these initiatives are voluntary, 
pledges and the few commitments are not yet implemented. The willingness to take serious 
action seems low compared with the pressing situation. However the Dodd-Frank Act in the 
USA3 proposes registration requirements for conflict minerals including coltan from that re-
gion. In Europe, the European Commission has quite recently introduced a similar proposal4 
for a country-by-country reporting for large listed and unlisted companies in the extractive 
and logging sectors.  
In order to learn more about the challenges towards transparency and certification, it is the 
intention of this paper to analyse the international trade dimension of this conflict. The au-
thors acknowledge the work that has been done to analyse the regional conflict and to provide 
evidence for an involvement of different actors. Doing new analysis on the Kivu region how-
ever is beyond the scope of this paper. Based on latest findings and focussing on the interna-
tional trade dimension, our paper raises the thesis that any certification scheme is faced with a 
number of challenges. In doing so we address the following issues: What is the dimension of 
illicit trade? What actors are involved in the international supply chain? What levels of gov-
ernance need to be addressed? With evidence on the significant amount of illicit trade and the 
heterogeneity of actors we conclude on activities that would (a) strengthen the institutional 
                                                
2 According to the World Bank, fragile states are low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The term is used for countries with weak institutional capacity, poor 
governance, and political instability (World Bank 2009). One also finds the term ‚failing states‘ in the literature; 
however this indicates a trend towards failing and given some progress in the DRC lately we prefer the term 
fragile state for the DRC. Stewart and Brown (2009) view the DRC among the worst performers with failure on 
two dimensions: lack of (1) authority to protect the citizens from violence and (2) provision of access to basic 
services, with clear implications in terms of poverty reduction. An exhaustive literature review on State fragility 
is provided in Hannan and Besada (2007).   
3 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/other_en.htm 
 3 
robustness of certification and (2) accompanying governance mechanisms that deem neces-
sary.   
These issues will be addressed in the following manner: the next two sections will give brief 
and up-to-date overviews about coltan markets and the mining situation in the DRC. A subse-
quent section will deal more extensively with international trade of coltan. It addresses mech-
anisms, actors and measurement issues. The last part will draw lessons for certification 
scheme and better resource governance and offers some guidance for future research.  
Going beyond coltan, a study by the World Economic Forum (2011: 23) refers to illicit trade 
of minerals in general as a major geopolitical risk with a market size of some US $ 20,000 
million annually. Thus we believe that such research is of relevance and part of a larger agen-
da on resources policy, international economics and sustainable resource management. 
*(&2,+,/3")&+04/"
Coltan is a term commonly used to refer to columbite-tantalite, a mineral extracted in Central 
Africa and belongs to a group that is internationally known as tantalum.5 This element of the 
5th group of the 6th period of the chemical periodical system occurs in the Earth crust with a 
share of roughly 2 ppm (parts per million), i.e. three times more often than silver. It has a 
strong geochemical coherence with niobium. The United States Geological Survey (USGS 
2011), Roskill (2009) as well as the Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (TIC) lo-
cate large reserves in Australia and Brazil, where new discoveries have been made in recent 
years. The global reserves were estimated to have been in the order of 110,000 t of contained 
tantalum in 2011 and considered adequate to meet projected needs. Worth noting: DRC, 
Rwanda and Ethiopia have not been included in the calculation due to lack of reliable data. 
The tantalum industry, characterized by USGS (2009: 52.2) as ‘traditionally shrouded in se-
crecy’,6 is comprised of (in order of material flow) a mining component that typically extracts 
ore and produces a concentrate, a processing segment that converts concentrate into an oxide 
or metal, a parts manufacturing segment that uses the oxide or metal material to produce such 
components as capacitors or superalloys, and an end-product manufacturing sector that uses 
the parts, such as capacitors, in electronic devices, such as cellular telephones (USGS 2011: 
2). Product range features tantalum oxide, powder, and Tantalum Carbide (TaC). Tantalum is 
also produced as a byproduct during tin smelting. Research must use all data with caution 
since they may capture different forms of tantalum. 7 
                                                
5 Tantalum minerals comprise e.g. tapiolite, wodginite, ixiolite, bismutotantalite, fermsite, stibiotantalite, simp-
sonite, microlite and minerals of the complex fergusonite, aeschynite and euxenite mineral groups. 
6 This statement is supported by the facts that there is no spot market / stock exchange price for tantalum and 
hence price transparency is low, small-scale mines of the Great Lakes Region are not yet documented and partly 
illegal, the small smelters in China are not yet monitored, trade is – as we point out – to a significant degree 
illicit, etc. Compared with other commodity markets such as copper, the market for coltan differs significantly! 
7 Notice that data refer to different units. This table represents our calculation method. UN COMTRADE refers 
to ores and concentrates of tantalum, niobium and vanadium without further specification. Implications will be 
discussed. 
Unit Used in Statistics Factor 
Gross mass (metric tons) Columbite-tantalite 
(Coltan) 
Countries in the Great Lakes Region, USGS 
Minerals Yearbook. Probably though not explici-
ty clarified: UN Expert Group, Global Witness, 
Garrett / Mitchell  
0,25 
Tantalum content, contained tantalum pen-
toxide (Ta2O5) 
Standard commodity, used in contracts. Parts of 
International Trade statistics (UN COMTRA-
DE), Chinese Import Statistics 
0,8 
Contained tantalum concentrate, Tantalite (Ta) USGS Mineral Commodities 1 
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For quite a long time, Australia had dominated the world market with shares being in the or-
der of 60 % or even above. The production situation has changed significantly over the recent 
years. The largest producer, Australian-based Talison (formerly Sons of Gwalia) has suspend-
ed its production in late 2008 due to difficulties of financing necessary investments and mar-
ket uncertainties during the financial crisis. USGS (2011) estimates the production amounts 
for 2009 as follows: Brazil (180t), Mozambique (110t), Rwanda (100t) Australia (80t), Cana-
da (25t), other countries (170t, including Burundi, DRC (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Somalia, Ugan-
da, and Zimbabwe). Further supply may have been provided by others.8 It is evident that in 
2009 Central Africa (including Mozambique) has been a major, if not the largest supplier of 
tantalum on the world market! This situation is very likely to continue in 2010-11. 
Figure 1: Tantalum, world mine production (unit: tantalum content, Ta2O5). 
Sources: USGS (2011) and various other years of its tantalum report; data for 2010 preliminary. 
Some supply is also provided by synthetic concentrates produced from tin slag, which are by-
products from tin smelting (7 % in 2008, Roskill 2009: 12). Secondary production and recy-
cling do not play a major role yet. Within industry, 20 – 25% of annual production inputs re-
sult from recycling activities done along production routes in attempts to reduce losses and 
minimize waste. Any approach to closing international material loops and to recycle tantalum 
from electronic goods and other products however barely exists. Reasons are related to  
• Technology issues – the shares within products are tiny, challenges of pulverization 
during dismantling processes are huge, hence a need to develop new recycling tech-
nologies has been expressed;9  
                                                                                                                                                   
Source: Roskill (2009: 6); USGS (2011: p. 52.13): Gross mass is mass of concentrate before metal is extracted, 
assumed to be one-third Ta2O5. Content is mass of metal produced; Ta2O5 is 81,897 % tantalum. In general, 
Ta2O5 contents of ores vary from 0,1 kg/t to 10 kg/t. 
8 Further estimations cover China (112 t), Russia (35 t), other Asian countries (57 t) as well as supply provided 
via tin slag (145 t) without changing the statement; we owe this information to Philip Schütte. See also Roskill 
(2009). 
9 Eurometaux’s proposals for the EU’s Raw Materials Initiative as of 11th June 2010, p. 49-50 (written with 
Institute for Applied Ecology). 
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• Economic issues - establishing collection and dismantling systems requires an interna-
tional approach implying high upfront transaction and investment costs while no regu-
lation exists; 
Thus, material leakage and dissipative losses are quite high. 
Market demand for tantalum has been increasing over the last 10 – 15 years. Some 60 % of 
tantalum is being used for capacitors in electronic goods and devices such as mobile phones, 
pagers, PCs etc. (Roskill (2009: 110ff). The continued growth of the mobile phone sector in 
Africa, Asia, and other regions will continue to be a source of growth. In addition, tantalum 
carbide is used for high-tech cutters, in air and space technology, and for turbines. Future de-
mand is expected to grow, with new applications in ICT, machinery, energy production tur-
bines, energy storage, aircrafts and optical industry. Possible substitutes in those areas exist, 
such as niobium in carbides or rare earth elements for high temperature applications. But none 
of these possible substitutes performs as effectively as tantalum so far, they may pose other 
challenges, and rare earth elements are regarded as critical metals too. For these reasons, tan-
talum ranks in the upper right quadrant of the EU’s Raw Material Initiative10 where the most 
critical minerals are listed; its economic importance is very high, the supply risk must be tak-
en serious, and the environmental dimension should not be overlooked.  
Thus, coltan mining in the DRC cannot be isolated from international markets and can hardly 
be focused on one application only (e.g. mobile phones). Research can transfer lessons from 
other conflict minerals, such as diamonds. However, coltan is not an end-product in itself and 
the production chain is complex. Thus, the specific characteristics of this material need to be 
considered in the design of any certification scheme (see below).  
5&+04/"6,/,/3",/"07$"8#5"
Due to specific geological conditions – deposits are too small to be amenable to large-scale 
industrial mining –, Coltan mining in eastern DRC is mainly done as artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM, Garrett 2008). ASM differs considerably by mineral and province in terms of 
how the sector is governed, how the economy and society are structured, and the form of the 
mining groups. The sector is dynamic in its proliferation, with new ASM sites springing up 
regularly, frequent power shifts and mineral-specific reconfigurations of actors and local in-
formal governance regimes.  
Employment is mainly for low-skilled local people. Estimations vary on the number of arti-
sanal miners between 500.000 and 2 million in DRC. With an average of four to five depend-
ents for each digger, the total number of persons whose livelihood depends on this activity 
could be as high as 8 to 10 million or up to 16 % of the total population of DRC (World Bank 
2008: Nest 2011: 17ff.). The majority of miners subsists on US$ 1-5 per day, and is often 
locked in debt to local traders and strongmen. Small scale miners have no legal mineral rights 
under the Mine Law (adopted 2002); instead of tax or mining license they have to buy annual-
ly a digger card for 25 US$ from provincial authorities. Many of the diggers cannot afford this 
amount, and at the same time government has no capacity to force the payment. Children are 
often employed too. Some mines operate on a barter economy, which makes it risky or impos-
sible for miners to save and invest. Nevertheless, in many parts of the DRC, ASM remains the 
sole income opportunity. Given the lack of alternatives however, Garett and Lintzer (2010: 
401) characterize ASM as the “safety net to support people and economies even under ad-
verse circumstances”.  
                                                
10 European Commission (2010): Critical raw materials for the EU. Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on 
defining critical raw materials. See also: Annex V to the Report, pp. 188ff.   
Accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw- materials/documents/index_en.htm 
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DRC has quite recently (June, 2011) adopted its first environmental legislation including, 
amongst other, environmental impact studies for mining activities (Republique Democratique 
du Congo, 2011). While big companies usually have knowledge and financial capacities to 
comply with the legislation and international standards, ASM activity in DRC normally 
doesn’t follow even low environmental standards. ASM, for example, also takes place in the 
lowland sector of Kahuzi Biéga National Park, one of the last resorts of mountain gorillas 
worldwide. The national park is listed as World Heritage Site in Danger, UNESCO reports 
that only few areas are covered by patrols (UNESCO, 2008 and 2011). As indicated by a 
study on the mining sector in DRC (World Bank 2008), the polluting effects of this artisanal 
activity include possible decadence of unsafe mine tailings and waste dumps, water pollution 
caused by acid mine drainage, improper closure of pits and mines, dumping of toxic effluent 
into the water, mining waste, etc. Landscape alterations such as forest clearance and cutting of 
timber and firewood are serious and often irreversible, with secondary effects on local agri-
culture, fishery and forestry that is devastating if small scale farmers hire themselves out as 
diggers (Nest 2011: 49). 
In addition to the environmental consequences directly and indirectly caused by mining, the 
presence of armed groups and their control over several areas can aggravate the destruction of 
natural habitats. In fact, the armed groups don’t limit themselves to profit from the extraction 
of minerals, but they finance themselves through the illegal exploitation of other natural re-
sources too (minerals such as gold, cassiterite, tungsten and other natural resources such as 
timber trade, meat, illegal fishing and poaching, UN 2010). Focusing regulation on one issue 
thus gives incentives to shifting illegitimate activities rather than abandoning them. 
There is robust evidence on how rebel groups are profiting from the minerals extraction and 
trade. Of the 13 major mines, 12 are said to be controlled by armed groups (Nathan / Sarkar 
2010: 22). The weakness of DRC’s institutions and the lack of an effective and sufficiently 
paid national army, are responsible for the proliferation of military groups, which replace this 
vacuum with alternative forms of governance. ASM is often controlled by small, locally-
based armed groups or militias, collectively called the mai mai. The larger armed units and 
the mai mai both “tax” the mines directly and indirectly extort money or minerals at the 
check-points they control. Especially two groups, the Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (CNDP), a political movement with a military wing called the Congolese National 
Army (CNA), and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) have been 
investigated by UN Expert Panels. CNDP presence is limited to few coltan mines. The Bi-
batama Coltan mine e.g. is owned by a national senator who seems to accept the presence of 
the CNDP and pays a price of $0.20/kg exported at checkpoints. FDLR, on the contrary, has 
been present in the two Kivus for at least 14 years. The group can count on a strong business 
network that enables the militia to receive the supplies needed, including weapons. The UN 
panel estimates that FDLR is reaping profits worth millions of dollars a year from trade of 
minerals in eastern DRC. For these relations they are described as “les grands commerçants” 
and they often involve Congolese civilians that are forced to act or trade on their behalf. More 
in general, the typologies of involvement of these armed groups in the mineral trade can vary, 
including taxation, payment of protection fees, commercial involvement in the mining activity 
and pillage.11 Worth noting, that these groups also profit from other minerals such as gold and 
cassiterite. 
The recent UN report (S/2010/596) establishes evidence on the involvement of the Congolese 
national army. Congolese army units are competing among themselves for control over min-
eral-rich areas; they collude with armed groups in order to attack rival commanders, and they 
                                                
11 See OECD (2010: 20f), UN report 2010 S/2010/596, pp.48-49 and UN S/2008/773, paras 73 and 779 for a 
more detailed description. 
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have gained control over large areas rich in natural resources in North and South Kivu prov-
inces. In Walikale territory, the part of North Kivu richest in cassiterite (tin ore), control of the 
minerals trade was “awarded” to the CNDP to encourage it to integrate into the Congolese 
army, as agreed in an early-2009 peace deal. Though the formal army in the DRC is paid, the 
payment is just low, so the challenge is about the magnitude of payment and incentives for 
additional sources of income. 
This situation of increasing involvement of armed groups in mineral trade and the difficulty of 
getting rid of it has been used as official justification by the Government of DRC for its tem-
porary freeze in the mining activities of the provinces of South and North Kivu and Maniema 
on 11 September 2010 (UN 2010). The consequences of this action on production are still 
unknown. The UN claims that mining activity is still ongoing at night. It is sure that those 
who will be mostly affected are the people who depend on this activity for their living.  
Main actors in coltan mining in the DRC are as follows (figure 2).It is thus not just a conflict 
over mining activities. Resource rents can be accrued throughout a number of subsequent 
transportation stages and intermediaries at local markets within the region. The number of 
actors involved (see graph) and the fact that official representatives and armed groups often 
cooperate make up for an intransparent situation. Even like-minded actors have difficulties to 
get evidence on whether any permission or certificate is legally correct and complies with 
basic laws. As a result, many actors benefit from the current situation, and there is hardly an 
incentive to change this from within: a self-perpetuating lock-in situation within a fragile 
state. 
Figure 2: The supply chain of coltan for electronics industry 
 
Source: Own compilation, OECD (2010), Resolve (2010), Garrett and Mitchell (2009), Global Witness (2009), 
TIC (2010), UN reports (2008, 2010), Enough! (2009).  
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Tantalum materials are not openly traded; there is no stock market or spot market where pric-
es could be compared. Purchase contracts are confidential between buyer and seller. Current 
data evidence reveals that Central Africa has become the major supplier for coltan / tantalum 
on world markets in 2009/10 – and possibly even earlier. However any estimation of the total 
amount of coltan produced in the DRC and traded internationally is limited by data availabil-
ity, comparability and reliability as well as by difficulties of tracing illegal trade in Eastern 
Congo. Thus, tracing any illicit trade and estimating the real amount of coltan produced in and 
exported by DRC remains a central challenge. 
The following part of our paper starts from the assumption that any illicit trade with coltan 
sooner or later enters the markets and is hence reflected in statistics downstream. Going be-
yond inconsistencies of DRC data, two possible gateways for such laundry mechanisms will 
be investigated:12 
1. Neighbouring countries: they may declare exports that are not entirely covered by add-
ing up domestic production and imports (and possible stockpiles). 
2. Importing countries: especially huge economies may declare imports that are not equal 
to exports of that respective country.13 
Our paper calculates coltan exports of DRC based on the information of those trading partners 
who reported to UN Comtrade14; this is compared with other available estimations (Roskill 
2009, USGS 2011, UN Expert Report 2008, Global Witness 2009, Garrett/Mitchell 2009). We 
use mass units because they are not biased by monetary valuation and price volatilities.15 Due 
to the fact that not all countries report their trade, bilateral trade results have to be considered 
as minimum exports from DRC.  
In addition, trade of coltan from DRC is estimated by analysing the trade flows of the neigh-
bouring countries in the African Great Lake region, especially Rwanda, which have been 
mentioned as preferred trade routes of illicit trade with coltan and other minerals (e.g. Gar-
rett/Johnson 2008; Garrett/Mitchell 2009; Global Witness 2009, 2010; UN Expert Panel 
2008). 
Available data give apparent evidence that DRC has been increasingly producing and export-
ing coltan especially since 2006 (see figure 3a and 3b). Trade data doesn’t specify content and 
concentration of the ores and concentrates; but the results are in line with other studies refer-
ring to gross mass of tantalum / niobium production. USGS (2011: 52.13) shows an increas-
ing production from 52t (2006) up to 267t (2007), 380t (2008) and 330t (2009, gross mass). 
While Roskill (2009) does not quantify tantalum production of DRC separately, Global Wit-
ness (2009) quoting official government statistics from North and South Kivu reveals that 
428.4 t of coltan (gross mass) were exported in 2007 and at least 270.79 t in the first half of 
2008. The UN Expert Report 2008 estimates that DRC produced and exported at least 393 t in 
2007 and 300 t between January and July 2008. Finally, a study by Garrett and Mitchell 
(2009) sums up the official figures16 from North and South Kivu for 2007 and 2008 (total + 
December estimate) and adds to these data a 35% estimation based on calculations on 
transport volumes. The values obtained are 360 t for 2007 and 517 t for 2008. These data dif-
                                                
12 Potentially it might also be interesting to assess business reports since coltan / tanatalum is input to specialized 
capacitor production with few producers worldwide it might be possible to get evidence for inconsistencies. But 
the data availability in that area is too poor yet. 
13 We refer, for example, to the comparison between exports figures from DRC and import figures from China. 
14 The DRC hasn’t been reporting trade figures to international organisations since 1987. 
15 See e.g. Dittrich (2009) on the physical dimension of international trade. 
16 The sources of data are Division des Mines of North Kivu and the private sector federation of Bukavu 
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fer by some 47% (USGS vs. UN Expert Panel in 2007) and 36% (USGS vs. Garret/Mitchell 
in 2008), and show clearly an upward production trend. 
In 2009, bilateral trade data (see fn 7) indicates that DRC exports mount up to a minimum of 
275 t with a value of around 4 million US$ – comparable to the combined production of Bra-
zil and Australia in that year.  
Figure 3a: Estimated production and aggregated trade of coltan ores of DR Congo, 1996 
- 2009  
Sources: UNComtrade (here and in the following: SITC-3-28785; please note: the classification includes tanta-
lum, niobium and vanadium; numbers don’t specify content and concentration of ores and concentrates. In line 
with other sources we assume that DRC does not export vanadium ores and the share of niobium and tantalum is 
around 50 : 50); USGS (2011) and various years; gross mass is mass of concentrate before metal is extracted; 
UN Expert Report 2008 (2008 only Jan-July); Global Witness 2009 (2008 only first half); Garrett/Mitchell 2009. 
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Figure 3b: trade of coltan ores of DR Congo by trading partners, 1996 – 2009 
 
 
Sources: UNComtrade; *Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Rep. of Korea; **Brazil, Germany, Estonia, Belgium; 
***South Africa, Uganda (each in order of relevance).  
As mentioned above, Rwanda is deemed to be the preferred trade route for illegally traded 
minerals financing the conflict parties for several reasons. Besides geographical reasons, ex-
ports of tantalum concentrates aren’t taxed in Rwanda while DRC has been taxing official 
mineral exports. Thus, trade via Rwanda is more profitable than legal exports via Kinshasa 
(Garrett/ Johnson 2008). According to Rwandan law, imported minerals could be declared as 
minerals produced in Rwanda if they are further processed in Rwanda and enhanced in value 
of about 30%. Thus, coltan imported from DRC to Rwanda could be legally exported as col-
tan from Rwanda without separating whether it was imported legally or illegally. Global Wit-
ness (2010: 13) even goes as far as to name Rwanda a laundering centre in international trade. 
Though Mozambique is according to USGS (2011) the most important producer of tantalum 
ores in Central Africa,17 Rwanda is the most important exporter of tantalum and niobium in 
Central Africa18 supplying around 75 % of all exported ores and concentrates of these metals 
in 2009 according to trade statistics. A comparison of trade and production information for 
Rwanda shows remarkable inconsistencies19 (see figure 4). Obvious are high net-exports 
                                                
17 TIC (2010) refers to misreporting of production figures in Mozambique. Comparing Mozambique’s trade data, 
our analysis is that relevant difference occurs in trade with USA; USA imports around 50 – 80 t more according 
to its own trade data than according to Mozambique’s trade information in 2007 – 2009. 
18 Burundi, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. Note: none of these countries are mentioned in USGS as important producer of vanadium; 
therefore it can be assumed that data quantify tantalum and niobium ores and concentrates. Worldwide, Brazil is 
main supplier for niobium (! 95 % of the world market). 
19 Analyzing production and trade data of Mozambique, Kenya and Uganda also brings to light incoherencies 
which could be indicating (partly or fully) illicit trade from DRC but they are minor compared to Rwandan sta-
tistics. 
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compared to very moderate production figures. However because of different definitions of 
tantalum ores and concentrates in UN Comtrade and USGS statistics (see fn 7), the mathemat-
ical difference should be interpreted with caution. Eye-catching is the rising gap between 
Rwanda’s information on exports and the information given by the trading partners since 
2006. According to Rwanda’s sources, it imports 131 t of tantalum and niobium ores from 
DRC in 2009 with a value of around $ 1.1 million, and exports around 949 t of tantalum with 
a value of around $ 18 million. According to its trade partners, however, Rwanda’s net-
exports of these ores and concentrates amount up to 3.195 t with a value of $ 41 million in 
2009. The difference of a factor 3.3 in production and 2.3 in value is striking but the interpre-
tation is not unambiguous. The data seems to indicate an increasing illicit trade since 2005 
from Rwanda for an amount that could hardly be quantified exactly.20 However the differ-
ences could also be caused (partly) by double-counting and implausible data reported by im-
porting countries21, most importantly Chinese imports that dominate the figure. 
Figure 4: Estimated coltan production and trade of Rwanda and Central African Coun-
tries 
 
 
Sources: UNComtrade, USGS; *Unspecified contents of tantalum, niobium and vanadium ores and concentrates.  
There is no doubt that a regional shift of trade pattern can be observed: during the nineties, 
western countries had been the dominant importers of coltan from DRC. Since 2000, Asian 
countries, most dominantly China, increasingly import coltan directly from DRC. This goes in 
line with the overall increase of trade between African countries on the one hand and on the 
other hand China and other developing countries who are investing predominantly in resource 
                                                
20 See also Global Witness (2010: 13) on Rwanda and cassiterite from DRC. 
21 Differences in monetary values may also (partly) be caused by different use of INCOTERMS: cif (=cost, In-
surance freight) values are often used for imports, fob (free on board) values are often used for exports. However 
in our view this cannot capture such differences. 
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rich African countries (UNCTAD, 2010). According to data from the Congolese Ministry of 
mines collected by the NGO Global Witness (2010), the coltan imported by China constitutes 
60 % of the North and South Kivu’s production. In 2009, China has purchased 121 t of coltan 
(most probably: gross mass) with a value of around 2.6 million US$ directly from DRC. 
China is also by far the most important importer of tantalum produced in the Central African 
region. Since 2000, China’s imports of tantalum and niobium ores from this region rose from 
435 t or 11.3 million US$ to 3.154 t with a value of 36.3 million US$ in 2009. Direct imports 
from DRC are minor compared to other suppliers, among which the most relevant is Rwanda 
(see figure 5). In physical terms, China imported around 73 % of all exported tantalum and 
niobium ores of the region (assuming that vanadium is rather negligible).  
Roskill (2009: 105) reports 1,656 t of imported tantalum minerals from Rwanda in 2008  – 
roughly 4,6 times the amount of Rwanda’s production according to USGS (2011: 52.13, 120 t 
ta content ! 490 t gross mass). Roskill’s numbers, based on private sector information, lies 
between Rwanda’s information of its net-exports of ores and concentrates of tantalum as well 
as niobium and information of trading partners about its net-imports of these ores and concen-
trates from Rwanda. If one assumes an import from DRC in the order of 131 t (data for 2008, 
including ca. 50 % niobium ores ! 262 t gross mass), the difference is significant. Their report 
also estimates main smuggling activities via Rwanda. With all uncertainties involved, one 
may thus estimate that 914 t of these minerals might stem from illicit trade – a share of some 
55 %. 
Compared to other importers like Hong Kong or Singapore, China’s imports have a signifi-
cantly lower price ($ 11.33 per kilogram tantalum and niobium ore versus $ 24.26 paid by 
other Asian importers). In this context, it is also interesting to note that prices for coltan from 
DRC have been increasing since 2007 while prices have been rather decreasing for exports 
from the other countries in this region. Prices for coltan imported from Rwanda had been con-
stantly low. In 2009 China purchased coltan for even less than $ 8 per kilogram according to 
its trade report while coltan exports from Rwanda costs between $ 13 and 31 per kilogram on 
a monthly average, depending on tantalum grades22. Roskill (2009: 148) reports that the aver-
age price of China’s imports from Rwanda has been 2 – 2.7 times lower than the import price 
of Australian tantalite. In the first half of 2009 it was 3.7 times lower. Not neglecting different 
qualities (see fn 7, these enormous differences can be assumed as key reasons for the strong 
position of Rwandaas a trade hub, the shifting of capacitor manufacturing to China, and the 
currently miserable situation of the conventional supply chain of tantalum. And, indeed, it 
fuels illegal and criminal activities of all kinds.  
Following the estimation of around 900 tonnes illicit trade in the most recent year and assum-
ing similar price ranges for coltan from DRC and Rwanda results in a loss of potential income 
in the order of between $ 12 and 28 million for DRC in that year.23 This is a significant 
amount in a country, which ranges at the bottom of development rankings (HDI position 187 
out of 187, UNDP 2011). On top of that one would also have to add loss of revenues from 
other illegal mineral exports. 
The typical supply chain of coltan produced in DRC and sold by illegitimate means thus looks 
as follows: it is exported via Rwanda or other Central African Countries, and is bought by 
Chinese processors. These processors are often smaller companies who do not have pressure 
to disclose information or to report. They, in turn, produce and export downstream products 
such as K-salt used to make capacitor-grade powder. Those products do enter the global mar-
ket while their origins are obscured. 
                                                
22 Personal information by Philip Schütte, BGR. 
23 See also Nest (2011: 94) and the calculation of $ 11,8 million in 2008 as estimated profit for armed groups. 
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Figure 5: China’s imports of tantalum and niobium from selected African countries 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (SITC-3-28785) 
According to the official statistics reported by Global Witness (2010), three Chinese compa-
nies figure among the main importers of coltan from the Kivus in 2009: Fogng Jiata Metals, 
Star 2000 Services and Unilink Trading Hong Kong. The latest UN report (2010) doesn’t con-
sider these companies as involved in the minerals trade from areas controlled by armed 
groups, but it is unclear how the Chinese government intends to meet any responsibilities in 
such trade.  
The case of CNMC Ningxia Orient Nonferrous Metal Group seems illustrative for these con-
cerns. The state-owned enterprise is one of the world’s top three smelters and producers of 
tantalum. The tantalum it produces is used by the largest capacitor manufacturers such as the 
US based AVX, that in turn supply electronics to companies such as Dell, Intel and RIM 
(‘Blackberry’) and Hewlett-Packard. Although the company claims to have transparent sourc-
ing practices, Global Witness (2010) has raised concerns that the K-salt24 that the company 
uses to produce tantalum and that it claims to come from refineries in China, can be used to 
cover the Congolese origin of the tantalum they use. Nathan / Sarkar (2010: 23) claim that 
Ningxia continues to import coltan from DRC despite all concerns. Ningxia has not responded 
to a questionnaire that was done by Resolve (2010: 39) in a attempt to address supply chain 
challenges for electronics industry and their use of critical metals.25 It is also interesting to see 
that capacitor production in China and exports thereof have been increasing rapidly over the 
previous few years, meaning that any supply chain management with certification rests more 
and more upon the credibility of China. 
                                                
24 K-salt is tantalum ore that has been chemically refined to make the compound called potassium tantalum fluo-
ride 
25 According to Resolve (2010: 39), all major producers of electronic goods responded on tantalum (Apple, Dell, 
HP, IBM, and others), roughly half of the component manufacturers, only one of the processors (Cabot), and 
none of the actors involved in earlier stages (except Talison, the Australian mining company). The study was 
done on behalf of the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) and the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition 
(EICC). 
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Our analysis reveals inconsistencies in tantalum data and indicates a remarkable scope for 
hiding illicit trade. Both the neighboring countries and the Chinese gateway show a dimension 
according to which the total amount of coltan traded may outweigh the official DRC produc-
tion, possibly by a factor of three. This magnitude is in line with UN expert group estimations 
that have been done domestically in the DRC in 2008 and 2010 and trade data. To illustrate 
this: if one assumes illegitimite imports from DRC/Rwanda to China in the dimension of 914 
t (gross weight 2008, see above, not to mention other illicit routes) and a market price of $ 87 
/ kg Ta2O5, the value of such illicit trade of tantalum comes close to $ 27 million annually,26 
roughly one fifth of the estimated world market volume for tantalum production. Though the-
se gateways are merely a first indication and not a robust result yet, the result gives an im-
pression of the potential revenues from coltan mining in DRC if coltan would be traded trans-
parently and legally.  
Production and trade data on minerals involved in armed conflicts are needed in an interna-
tionally comparable scheme with open access, supported by reliable national and regional 
reporting requirements. This should include detailed information about local origin, prices and 
ore concentrations. In the short term, it could be organized by an international group of ex-
perts in charge with collecting, comparing and evaluating available data, including data on 
international trade.27 In the medium term, it would be favorable to harmonize international 
statistical methods and classifications, and to develop full material flow accounts including 
secondary production and recycling as well as financial flows.  
Despite all uncertainties regarding data, however, analysis can draw useful lessons for any 
certification scheme. The following three governance challenges become obvious:  
Firstly, Central Africa including the DRC and Mozambique is now the largest supplier of col-
tan / tantalum on world markets. Our short analysis of the DRC reaffirms that major actors in 
the region cooperate in their efforts to profit from mining and trading coltan. The conflict 
structure is dominated by rent-seeking activities of a number of actors over all stages of the 
supply chain until it enters official markets, not just by fighting over mining licences. The 
involvement of DRC officials, the ability to earn incomes higher than average as well as the 
desperate situation of the local population, triggered by high world market demand and no 
transparency requirements, favor a rather perverse stability of such situation. Any certification 
scheme thus should take into account the ability of all actors involved to mix legal mining 
products with others along the first stages of the supply chain.  
Secondly, coltan (tantalum) has interesting characteristics for a number of technology applica-
tions. Focusing on one application (e.g. mobile phones) may raise awareness but bears the 
risks of shifting production patterns to other technology areas where public attention is com-
paratively low. In addition, focusing on a limited number of conflict minerals gives incentives 
for shifting illegitimate activities to other profitable minerals. The scope thus should cover all 
applications and all commodities from conflict regions. 
Thirdly, the involvement of China, other Asian countries and production located there lead to 
international governance challenges while transparency is poor. The large number of small 
producers for a number of tantalum products such as K-salt and tantalum powder makes it 
fairly difficult to establish a reliable certification scheme. Moreover, the international dimen-
sion adds un-intended negative effects to certification schemes: if like-minded producers 
                                                
26 Calculated as follows: 914 (difference between imports acc. to Roskill 2008 and exports) : 3 (weight factor for 
Ta2O5) x 87,000 ($ acc. to Popp, USGS 2011) 
27 Indeed it should include the data provided from recent efforts such as ICGLR certification and initiatives that 
might follow the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and the European Commission’s proposals (see annex). 
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manage to establish a sustainable supply chain management for a number of commodities 
(however difficult this may be!), their competitors and other value chains will benefit. With 
growing markets in Africa and Asia that do not have to comply with any certification in the 
US or in the EU this is a real risk. Economics supports such argument: a split demand results 
in a split price and split awareness, i.e. higher prices for those concerned and lower prices for 
those who do not care. Probably, the conflict situation wouldn’t change much! 
Governance challenges for certification thus relate to feasibility and reliability, to the scope, 
and to the international dimension. Above all, one should conclude that certification efforts 
should be accompanied be profound reforms in governance.   
A two track approach of pilots on the region and capacitor-based certification may yield re-
sults. Since capacitor manufacturers consume roughly half of the tantalum world-wide and 
have a strong position in the supply chain, more attention should be focused here. The region-
al certification scheme developed by the ICGLR (International Conference of the Great Lakes 
Region) is a useful initiative in that regard. The mechanism, which had been formally adopted 
by the ICGLR heads of state, covers cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold and aims at 
achieving compatibility with other initiatives, such as ITSCi (Initiative of the Tin Smelting 
Capacitor Industry), GeSI (Global electronics Sustainability Initiative) and EICC (Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition). Its main elements are chain of custody tracking from mine to 
export at country level,28 regional tracking of mineral flows through the creation of a database 
on their purchases, independent audits on all actors in the supply chain and a monitoring of 
the whole mineral chain by a Mineral Chain Auditor (Blore and Smillie, 2011). Compliance 
with certification schemes and data disclosure in their business reports is a key; third party 
audits, as suggested by OECD (2010), will improve reliability. Public offerings at regional 
stock exchanges may be options for the future. In particular it would help in the establishment 
of an international comprehensive monitoring mechanism and any enforcement.  
These certification initiatives are taking advantage of the Kimberley Process for the certifica-
tion of diamonds. Important lessons cover the purpose, administrative and operational aspects 
(Blore and Smillie, 2011).29 Following Haufler (2010) the elements of establishing inclusive 
and relatively strong institutions can be seen as key elements for success as well as market 
leverage in industrialized countries. The conclusion indeed is that administrative capacity 
building in the region with independent auditing will be a key to establish reliable evidence 
and to fight corruption. However, coltan differs from diamonds because 
1. The number of actors involved upstream and their ability to mix illegitimate sources 
with legal ones during the first stages of the supply chain are huge; centralizing traders 
and monitoring 100% of their operations should be useful; 
2. The security situation in the region remains fragile; 
3. The production chain downstream is much more complex and entirely globalized, with 
Chinese companies being in the largest position; 
4. Tantalum is not an end-product in itself, many companies are unaware yet whether it 
is a component in one of their products, and consumers have difficulties to realize it 
either.  
                                                
28 This aspect includes the emission of a regional certificate to ensure that mineral don’t originate from conflict 
areas or are not illegally transferred among countries. 
29 Concerning the purpose, the system needs a flexible approach and objectives should also aim at incorporating 
longer-term goals of governance, development and ethical practices. As for the administrative aspects, the sys-
tem should cover the whole supply chain, ensure transparency and inclusive decision-making, and include a 
strong administrative structure to manage it. Finally, operational aspects include ensuring that production sites 
are free from militia/armed forces, databases on production-exports of minerals, independent third party monitor-
ing and follow up of problems, credible sanctions for defectors (Blore and Smillie, 2010). 
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Thus a better coordination among international approaches to promote legal mineral trade is at 
stake. Table 1 (see Annex) reports relevant initiatives. Attempts to promote transparency 
should generally be supported because they have positive side-effects on markets and against 
corruption; however better coordination and harmonisation of data is a key to minimize over-
laps and unproductive information overflow. International initiatives like the Extractive In-
dustries Transparency Initiative (EITI) coincide with legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act 
in the USA30 and the proposals of the European Commission to introduce transparency and 
accountability obligations for large public and not-public companies in the extractive and for-
estry sectors. The two legal initiatives may also have triggered the recent statement by the 
Congolese government to require „all organisations and individuals involved in the mining, 
transportation, sale, processing and export of the four conflict minerals“ to introduce due dili-
gence practices along their value chain (Global Witness, 11th October 2011).31  
This proves that voluntary efforts should be supported by international law to promote trans-
parency, certification and accountability against corruption and in favour of sustainability. 
Following a suggestion made by Collier and Venables (2010: 15), the anti-bribery legislation 
that the OECD now requires of its membership could be a requirement of WTO membership 
– a compliance issue for China and elsewhere. In the long run, an international agreement on 
sustainable resource management might also be an option (Bleischwitz 2009). 
A two track approach of pilots on the region and capacitor-based certification as outlined 
above should also be accompanied by better governance at both the national and regional lev-
el. As Mitchell and Garrett (2010) claim the general conditions and social sector reforms in 
Eastern DRC are urgent preconditions for any progress. As regards to prices and taxation, 
most researchers share the impression that the current systems neither capture negative exter-
nalities nor do they promote regional sustainable development. A general assessment and re-
view of the DRC tax system with emphasis on simplification, transparency and accountability 
as well as raw material taxation at the extraction point would not only generate revenues but 
also give financing opportunities and incentives for value adding activities in the region (Gar-
rett/ Mitchell/ Lintzer 2010). However tax competition with neighbouring countries (e.g. 
Rwanda) should be minimized via agreements – the EU offers a lot of practical guidance on 
how coordination can work. Such taxation also helps to establishing an appropriate legal order 
and could give more social security to mining workers and along the regional supply chain.  
Ensuring that the profit from the mining sector trickles down to the local population with val-
ue creating activities may benefit from the establishment of an independent and accountable 
resource management fund. A regional resource fund where money of different donors and 
actors involved (public and private) can be pooled, could help ensuring better coordination 
among different actions, better allocation of investments and better division of the tasks. In 
addition, an improved and effective mining law that could be implemented with international 
support until the actual resource conflict is solved should be considered.32  
UNCTAD (2008, 2010) suggests linking revenues of rising commodity prices strategically to 
developing goals such as infrastructure, education, health care or economic diversification, 
using even bilateral trade agreements in this context, e.g. by exporting raw materials for the 
construction of infrastructure. This could mean that the DRC extends the existing formal trade 
with China and other countries using their interest in coltan and other raw materials in order 
                                                
30 In November 2011 a Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade has been launched in the US to 
support the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act 
31 Companies or individuals not complying within 45 days will be imposed administrative sanctions e.g. with-
drawal of business licenses (Global Witness, 11th October 2011). 
32 Satellite fotos in military quality of the conflict areas can be useful in that regard. Garrett and Lintzer (2010) 
give arguments why the national government should further retire from extraction activities. Discussing the role 
of the UN as well as legal frameworks is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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to finance governmental presence and (re-) build public infrastructure and improve processing 
capacities in its eastern parts. Further analysis may also shed light on the role of a develop-
ment state and implications for any sustainable growth to contest the theory of a resource 
curse in this region (Collier / Goderis 2007; Gylfason 2009; World Bank 2008). 
5&/)+'%,&/%"
Our analysis of international trade statistics reveals a significant amount of illicit coltan in the 
order of some 20 % on world markets (2009/10).  At the heart of any solution should be the 
insight that markets need transparency and appropriate prices – safeguarded by proper institu-
tions – to function properly. Illicit trade, intransparency and corruption are to be seen as major 
risks for the local population and for business. Market failures are likely to have substantial 
costs, in particular for a region like eastern DRC, but also for the market itself.  
However a common interest for comprehensive solutions exists and stems from the critical 
need for such metals both in high-tech industries as well as in most countries. Australian min-
ing company Talison is ready to re-enter the market as soon as current uncertainties will be 
reduced. Thus our estimation that current efforts to establish certification may have the un-
wanted side-effect of negative impacts in the eastern DRC should also lead to support for bet-
ter governance in the region and in markets for minerals. Chinese companies, and in particular 
state-owned enterprises, should accept their responsibility to perform supply chain due dili-
gence. Efforts to promote Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) with its focal point China may help to level the playing field.33 
Further analysis will also have to develop governance mechanisms to turn illicit trade in min-
erals into opportunities for sustainable development. This will not only require harmonized 
data and monitoring, but also capacity building initiatives and enforcement systems for the 
main stakeholders as well as better institutions such as resource taxation systems. As ex-
pressed above, new international legal and economic mechanisms should be established. In 
that regard, the current barriers and deficits might be removed by international incentives for 
re-use and recycling: material stewardship is an encouraging concept where capacitor produc-
ers currently are key business actors. They should be part of a future international covenant 
for the recycling of critical metals that involves in particular electronics industry (Wilts / Ble-
ischwitz 2011). Aim in this context is to increase industrial recycling, to collect more con-
sumer goods and to establish recycling facilities internationally. Such covenant is well in line 
with high prices for primary resources as well as with fair trade. 
This is, of course, an agenda that goes beyond the scope of our case study. Having said this 
however the authors also wish to express the view that bans are a less desirable option be-
cause they would result in further economic hardship for the Congolese people. Putting the 
raw material conflict issue in the framework of sustainable resource management and interna-
tional governance for trade in natural resources probably is a better way forward. 
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    Annex- international initiatives and coverage of the value chain of coltan 
Initiative Action description Actors respon-
sible 
Part of supply 
chain  
Synergies with other 
actions 
Relevance for Central Africa Risks 
UN-EU partnership 
on natural industries 
and conflict preven-
tion 
Aims at ensuring inclusion of 
conflict prevention and sensitivity 
in NRM programs. It provides a 
framework and technical assis-
tance useful to EU and UN 
agencies to plan and design 
intervention strategies where 
extractive industries are driving 
factors of the conflict 
EU and UN UN and the EU, 
extractive industries, 
governments  
EITI, capacity build-
ing/technical assistance 
DRC is one of the country of operation. Although 
Guidance Notes, training manuals, and online self-
paced learning tool are available, it will not benefit 
from training modules for UN and EU field staff, as 
well as local partners, which will take place in four 
pilot countries: Timor Leste, Liberia, Peru and 
Guinea-Conakry. However, in 2008 UNEP estab-
lished a Country Programme aiming “to assist the 
government of DR Congo in its post-conflict 
recovery and sustainable development”  
contribution of other key parties 
is needed in order to achieve a 
peaceful outcome in a coordinat-
ed and constructive manner 
EITI, EITI++ 
 
disclosure of public reve-
nues/expenses 
Governments 
and companies 
Local companies 
(comptoires/mining 
companies) 
Capacity building pro-
grammes, initiatives sup-
porting transparency in the 
value 
chain(certification/chain of 
custody assurance) 
DRC was accepted as candidate country in 2008. In 
2011 its Candidate status was renewed by the EITI 
Board. In March 2013 the country will be required 
to comply with the 2011 edition of the EITI Rules 
for EITI Validation for. Zambia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania are the other Candidate countries in the 
region 
It covers only one part of a 
broader resource management 
process. Problems in implementa-
tion due to the fragmentation of 
state organizations 
OECD/UN  
due diligence 
Due diligence framework and 
practical guidance on how to 
manage risks 
Up/down-
stream opera-
tors 
Up/down-stream 
operators 
Promotes the use of 
schemes for traceability 
(iTSCi), EITI 
The OECD, the ICGLR and the UN Group of 
Experts on the DRC are cooperating in the imple-
mentation of the Guidance in Africa's Great Lakes 
region. Currently, 82 companies and industry 
associations are volunteering taking part in the pilot 
Too burdensome requirements, 
might push companies from 
OECD countries out of the sector 
Capacity building of 
governments (e.g. 
Promines -Programme 
intégré et multisecto-
riel de développement 
du secteur minier en 
RDC ) 
Strengthening capacity of key institutions to 
manage mineral sector, improving condition for 
investment and socio-economic benefits 
Local institu-
tions, interna-
tional donors 
Local institutions, 
business environ-
ment 
Attends to gaps in EITI, 
supports the creation of 
traceability systems 
PROMINES was launched in 2009 in DRC Difficult implementation envi-
ronment in the region (e.g. situa-
tion in DRC), limited resources 
for too wide scope 
Certified Trading 
Chains (CTC) 
Ensure chain of custody for 
producers and buyers (verifica-
tion of origin and trade volume 
analysis, independent audits); on-
the-ground assessment of mining 
conditions 
BRG and the 
local ministry of 
mines (DRC, 
Rwanda) 
Mining production 
and trade (focus on 
companies’ conces-
sions - LSM) 
Capacity building pro-
grammes, fingerprinting 
process 
Implementation of the scheme has been satisfactory 
in Rwanda. Concerning DRC, the pilot project in 
South Kivu is at an earlier stage. CTC offices have 
been created in Kinshasa and Bukavu and work-
shops held to better define the criteria for the 
implementation of the initiative 
Capacity building needed, multi-
ple stakeholders involved can 
hamper the process 
iTSCi 
 
Ensure traceability of minerals 
(phase I- introduction of due 
diligence procedures, written 
documentation, independent 
audits; phase II- “bag and tag 
system” of traceability) 
Initiative of the 
tin smelting 
industry  
Suppliers and ex-
porters of minerals 
(in particular ASM) 
Possible interaction with 
Capacity building pro-
grammes, EICC/GeSi, 
OECD/UN due diligence 
guidelines.  Could be 
integrated in CTC as 
traceability scheme. 
Pilot projects started in south Kivu in 2010, but 
have been stopped due to the mining suspension 
from September 2010. Since 2011, implementation 
phase in Rwanda and the southern DRC province 
of Katanga. The scheme may be extended to Bu-
rundi and Uganda, if funding is assured, and even-
tually the entire Great Lakes Region 
Security of mining sites, com-
mercial visibility, need to publish 
data for awareness raising 
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Analytical Fingerprint 
(AFP) 
Independent mineral traceability 
tool 
Up to now: 
BRG 
Mining and trade Forms part of CTC certifi-
cation scheme; can be 
linked to iTCSi  
Pilot projects are being implemented in  Rwanda. 
The system is supposed to be extended to other!
ICGLR countries among which DRC 
Complex and costly implementa-
tion, stakeholders facilitation and 
institutional support needed 
Global e-
Sustainability Initia-
tive and  Electronic 
Industry Citizenship 
Coalition - !Conflict-
Free Smelter (CFS) 
protocol  
GeSI/ EICC  offer a tool relating 
to smelter due diligence require-
ments and support for certifica-
tion of smelters.   
Initiative of 
electronics 
industry 
Smelters Link with mineral certifi-
cation schemes (iTSCi and 
CTC) 
The mechanism concerns smelters sourcing from 
DRC and adjoining countries 
Complexity of ITC supply chain 
ICGLR certification 
scheme 
International Conference of  the 
Great Lakes Region, Regional 
certificate of origin scheme, 
harmonization, promotion of 
dialogue 
ICGLR Local produc-
ers/traders 
Complementarity with 
other point of origin certi-
fication schemes (CTC, 
iTSCi) 
DRC and Rwanda are member States of the 
ICGLR, together with Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Kenya, 
Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia. The countries 
are all signatories of the!Regional Initiative against 
the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
providing the framework for actions in the domain 
of natural resources exploitation 
Ownership issues 
Bans mining/export of the mineral is 
prevented 
Governments/ 
international 
community 
Extraction phase or 
exports from the 
producing country 
May be symbolic part of 
broader action 
A mining ban was instituted in DRC from Septem-
ber 2010 to March 2011 
Bringing further economic hard-
ship for people , costly and 
difficult to enforce 
Dodd Frank act Legal obligation on US compa-
nies reporting to SEC to declare 
use of “conflict minerals” 
SEC, SEC 
reporting com-
panies 
SEC reporting 
companies with 
activities in  explo-
ration, discovery, 
development and 
extraction, pro-
cessing, export and 
other significant 
actions 
Due diligence guidelines 
and iTSCi 
Dodd Frank section 1502 is a disclosure require-
ment, concerning sourcing conflict minerals from 
DRC or adjoining countries 
 
Compliance issues, questionable 
impact on Congolese people. 
EC Accounting and 
Transparency Direc-
tives 
The rules of the Directives re-
quire extractive industry and 
forestry companies to declare 
payments (production entitle-
ments, taxes or profit, royalties, 
dividends, license fees, other 
benefits to governments) to 
governments in every country 
they operate and on a project-by-
project base 
  
Listed and large 
or public inter-
est non-listed 
companies 
active in the 
extractive or 
logging indus-
tries  
Extractive and 
logging companies 
with activities in 
exploration, discov-
ery, development 
and extraction 
phases 
EITI but also other certifi-
cation schemes and due 
diligence guidelines 
The directives refer to companies in the extractive 
industry or forestry in whatever country they 
operate   
Debated points (covering compa-
nies in other sectors, disclosure of 
more information, elimination of 
exemptions, etc.). The proposal 
has to be approved by the Euro-
pean Parliament and Council and 
implemented in the Member 
States. 
Starec plan Rehabilitation and regulation of 
mining. Establishments of mar-
ketplaces (centres de negoce) in 
key mining areas 
Government of 
DRC, artisanal 
miners and their 
associations 
Traders, merchants, 
diggers, mineral and 
state authorities 
 The programme covers DRC Challenge on how to manage 
security  
Source: Authors’ elaboration of different sources. 
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